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Aereo Dynamics: ‘‘User Rights” and The Future of
Internet Retransmission in Canada
Pradeepan K. Sarma*
Abstract
2014’s U.S. Supreme Court decision Aereo made waves in the entertainment and
technology industry when it ruled in favour of a coterie of cable companies against
an upstart start-up, Aereo Inc., retransmitting broadcast television over the
internet. Little attention, however, has been paid to its ramifications to the
Canadian broadcasting regime, with its vastly different regulatory scheme and an
underlying objective to promote the dissemination of Canadian content.
Complicating matters further is the 2012 Canadian Supreme Court decision
Cogeco, where the retransmission of broadcast signals had been re-articulated as a
’user right’. This paper uses the Aereo decision as a heuristic tool to examine the
Canadian retransmission regime with respect to the internet streaming of broadcast
television, in which I argue that a firm employing ’Aereo’-like technology can help
fulfill the CRTC’s mandate to advance the objectives of the Broadcasting Act that
underpins Canadian communication law, and indeed, can and should be legal under
Canada’s current copyright and telecommunications regime. I further contend that
the retransmission of broadcast television is a ’user right’ in Canada and
consequently does not constitute a copyright violation. The paper ends by
examining the contours of the new ’user right’ to retransmission and how it
relates to the existing ’user rights’ discourse introduced by the Supreme Court in
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada.
[T]he Internet will replace cable systems as the single method of distribution of
television, radio and other content, becoming the sole medium for the
distribution of digital works.
— Submission of JumpTV in response to Call for comments concerning Internet
Retransmission (Order in Council P.C. 20021043)1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine Montrealers viewing an over-the-air (OTA) feed of a heated
mayoral debate on CTV while on their metro commute home, college students in
Hamilton streaming a feed of a local music festival from an independent
television station to their TV-less dorm, or residents of rural Nunavut watching

*

1

B.C.L./LL.B., McGill University, Faculty of Law; LL.M. Candidate, Tel Aviv
University, Buchmann Faculty of Law
See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting
Public Notice CRTC 2003-2, 17 January 2003 at para. 22 [Public Notice CRTC 2003-2].
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Aboriginal Peoples Television Network on their laptops without an expensivebut-otherwise-necessary satellite subscription.
Reading the Broadcasting Act, one would likely conclude that a company
providing the services described above would well support the objectives of the
Act. 2 Indeed, reading a recent Canadian Radio-televi sion and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) report about its struggles in
ensuring the vitality of OTA television,3 one would assume that such a service,
increasing as it does the distributive range of OTA television, is precisely what is
needed to rejuvenate the relevance of Canadian broadcast television in the
twenty-first century.
Yet the means to provide such a service is, under Canada’s Copyright Act
(CCA), ostensibly precluded from functioning without being encumbered by
onerous copyright restrictions. The CCA’s television retransmission regime was
specifically intended for retransmissions of broadcast television to take place
without infringement or authorization.4 However, amendments in 2002 have
been interpreted as excluding ‘‘new media retransmitters” internet
retransmitters—from its ambit, ‘‘effectively impos[ing] a gratuitous cost for the
use of more efficient, Internet-based technologies.”5
The American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) decision in 2014 by
the Supreme Court of the United States6 effectively closed the door to internetbased television retransmitters after Aereo Inc.’s nascent service was ruled liable
for copyright infringement. The Canadian context is different. Given an updated
legislative scheme,7 a public that is more cognizant of its own interests than in the
past, and a judiciary that has reintroduced the centrality of the public
domain8—allowing in a bevy of new interpretive principles in conceptualizing
its provisions—it is an opportune moment to examine Canada’s own broadcast
retransmission regime.

2
3

4

5

6

7
8

Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, s. 3 [Broadcasting Act or BA].
See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting
Public Notice CRTC 2007-53, 13 May 2007 at para. 11-12; CRTC Broadcasting Public
Notice 2008-100, 30 October 2008 at paras. 17, 18, 41, 42 [Public Notice 2008-100];
Broadcasting Notice of Consultation CRTC 2014-190, 8 September 2014 at paras. 66,
70-76, 81-82.
Reference re Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991 (Canada), 2012 SCC 68, 2012 CarswellNat
4810, 2012 CarswellNat 4811 (S.C.C.) at para. 72 [Cogeco].
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 42, ss. 21, 31(1) [Copyright Act]; Public Performance of
Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 34, 2012 CarswellNat 2376, 2012 CarswellNat 2377
(S.C.C.) at para. 9 [Entertainment Software Assn. or ESA].
See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 2014)
[Aereo].
See Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [Copyright Modernization Act].
Abraham Drassinower, ‘‘Taking Rights Seriously” in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public
Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 462 at 463.
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This paper will proceed as follows: after a brief introduction into Canada’s
retransmission regime, I will detail the facts of the Aereo Supreme Court decision
and the events leading up to it: the nature of the service, Aereo Inc.’s journey
through various U.S. courts, and the legal principles behind the U.S. Supreme
Court’s eventual ruling against it. I will then continue with an examination of the
Canadian retransmission regime of section 31, the right to ‘‘retransmit” having
recently been identified as a ‘‘user right” in a recent Canadian Supreme Court
decision,9 before making my argument: Under Canadian law, Aereo can qualify
under the retransmission regime. First, I will argue that an Aereo-like service
could benefit from the retransmission regime, and contrary to popular belief,
would not be pre-emptively barred from being licensed by the CRTC, provided it
obtained the requisite broadcasting distribution undertaking (BDU) licence that
other BDUs need to qualify. Second, I will discuss the factors that weigh in
favour of Aereo being eligible for a licence as a BDU under section 9 of Part II of
the Act. Following this analysis, I will offer a preliminary mapping of the
contours of ‘‘retransmission” as a user right, arguing that understanding
retransmission as a user right requires a conceptual shift from previous
appraisals of the right in Canadian law which is otherwise anchored in fair
dealing.

I. THE CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND BROADCASTING REGIME
(a) The U.S. Context
The complexity of U.S. copyright law when it comes to the regulation of
digital-era technologies reflects the largely court-driven process of interpreting
the use of new technologies, as its copyright statute has yet to be significantly
modified since 1998, with its last major reform in 1976.10 Strongly vested
interests (and parties created to offset those interests) have stymied legislative
attempts at reform,11 forcing courts into the unenviable role of interpreting
provisions that have seen little change in decades and reflect the preoccupations
of previous eras. There is a silver lining in the status quo, however. While
legislative gridlock in the U.S. may produce uncertainty with respect to the
legality of new technologies, the lack of legislation sometimes had the benefit of
leaving open avenues of potential legality, at least until the technology had time
to proliferate enough that efforts by incumbent businesses threatened by a
particular new technology could be counterbalanced by public response. 12
9
10

11

12

See Cogeco, supra note 4.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 810 (1976) [U.S. Copyright Act]; Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332; 28 (1998).
See generally, Jessica Litman, Digitial Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001);
see also John Tehranian, “Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap” (2007) 2007:3 Utah L Rev 537 at 543 [Tehranian].
Tehranian, ibid. ‘‘In recent years, mainstream publications have regularly featured large
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(b) The Canadian Context
In contrast, up until the last few years,13 many of the CCA’s amendments
have been reflective of the needs of vested interests14 concerned more about
protecting existing business models from potential risks wrought by new
technologies than in legislation that would better allow Canadians to harness
these technologies. Perhaps that has to do with, at least until the exceptional days
of ‘‘balanced copyright,”15 a public which saw digital-age copyright reform as the
obscure concern of techies and corporate suits16 (which, to be fair, it was), and
that until the latter half of the 2000s internet technologies had yet to play the
prevailing role to the public that they do today.
Canada has more recently been proactive in attempting to tackle the
challenges of applying digital-era technologies to the venerable strictures of its
copyright law, resulting in the passage of Bill C-11, the Copyright Modernization
Act, which came into effect in 2012.17 While no less complicated, this has resulted
in considerable legislative divergences between the two regimes.

(c) Canadian Broadcasting Regime: Overview of its Copyright-Related
Aspects
Historically, television broadcasts and their retransmissions have been
regulated by the Broadcasting Act (BA). Its mandate is more than simply the
management of an effective and efficient broadcasting system—access to the
public radio spectrum and the means of transmitting the results of such access
are regulated in order to promote, protect, and disseminate particular cultural
aims. Its primary focus has been the “cultural enrichment of Canada through the
broadcasting of programs which involve a significant amount of Canadian
artistic creativity”18 and to that end the Act authorizes the CRTC to “regulate
and supervise the Canadian broadcasting system.”19

13
14

15

16
17
18

spreads on copyright issues that would have previously appeared arcane and esoteric.
Groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation the Creative Commons, and the
Future of Music Coalition have emerged as powerful forces to offset the lobbying
interests of the entertainment and publishing industries, and programs such as Stanford
Center for Internet and Society’s Fair Use Project have begun public interest litigation to
vindicate fair use rights against overly aggressive copyright holders. Indeed, copyright
activism has become commonplace” ibid at 542.
See Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 7.
See Sam Banks & Monique Hebert, Parliamentary Research Branch, Legislative
Summary LS-437E, Bill C-11: An Act to Amend the Copyright Act (10 October 2002), at
1-2, 6, 10 [Legislative Summary LS-437E].
See generally Michael Geist, From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010).
Tehranian supra note 11 at 539.
Bill C-11: An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 44th Parl, 2012.
Reference re Federal Courts Act (Canada), 2010 FCA 178, 2010 CarswellNat 2092, 2010
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Cable television started out in the 1940s as ‘‘community antenna television”
(CATV)—a means by which broadcast signals could be distributed to remote
areas that could otherwise not be reached. Essentially, this meant that large
antennas were assembled in certain well-placed locations that received, amplified,
and distributed these signals through coaxial cable systems directly to homes. 20
In Canada, given the nationalistic aims of its broadcasting policy, this was a
significant means to supplement the existing broadcasting industry to further its
cultural policy goals.
While broadcasts had been previously allowed to be retransmitted without
any copyright infringements,21 amendments to section 3(1)(f) gave broadcasters a
right to their signals, and a retransmission regime was created in 1988 to reflect
Canada’s free trade obligations22 under which cable companies could continue to
retransmit provided they were licensed by the CRTC. In order to be licensed as a
BDU, the perspective BDU licensee is required by the CRTC to carry out various
requirements to fulfil aims essential to the vitality of the Canadian broadcasting
system as set out in the BA.23 Broadcast television is the primary means by which
the CRTC ensures that Canadians have access to Canadian content by imposing
upon these television stations rigorous content regulations.24 To that end, one of
the BDU license’s most significant requirements is the mandatory carriage of
local broadcast stations, ensuring (or at least helping) their maximal
dissemination.25 The retransmission regime in the CCA facilitates these aims
by precluding these retransmissions of local broadcast signals from any copyright
infringement, preventing the need for onerous negotiations with content-holders
that may otherwise be “not only a process of questionable efficiency and even
possibility but, among other things, could permit a single holdout to force a
conventional BDU to choose between compliance with its broadcasting
regulatory obligations and copyright infringement.”26 Thus, the retransmission
regime is viewed as instrumental to fulfilling basic public policy objectives.

19
20

21

22

23
24

25

26

CarswellNat 3295 (F.C.A.) at para. 49, affirmed 2012 CarswellNat 214, 2012
CarswellNat 215 (S.C.C.) [Reference].
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 1.
John P. Cole, ‘‘Community Antenna Television, The Broadcaster Establishment, and
the Federal Regulator” 1965 14 Am U L Rev 124 at 126-127.
Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion Inc., 1954 CarswellNat 5, [1954] Ex. C.R. 382
(Can. Ex. Ct.) [Rediffusion].
Cogeco, supra note 4 at 75; Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, S.C. 1988, c. 65 s. 62.
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, ss. 9-11.
See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting
Public Notice CRTC 1999-84/ Telecom Public Notice CRTC 99-14, Report on New
Media, 17 May 1999 [hereinafter Report].
Public Notice 2008-100 at paras 41-42; Broadcasting Distribution Regulations, SOR/97555, s. 17.
Intellectual Property Policy Directorate (Industry Canada) & Copyright Policy Branch
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In 1999, the CRTC created an ‘‘Exemption Order for New Media
Broadcasting Undertakings” [‘‘Order”]27 exempting broadcasting undertakings
that provide “broadcasting services delivered or accessed over the internet” from
the licensing regimes otherwise required to be lawful under the BA. Shortly after,
two Canadian start-ups, iCraveTV and JumpTV, saw the internet’s
disintermediary28 promise (and threat) by streaming television over it. 29
However, their operations were forced against established media players
determined to cauterize their existing business models from outside threats, a
legislature with little interest in upsetting the status quo, and a CRTC which saw
the promise of new technologies to its mandate, but favoured the control its
carefully-managed and labyrinthine regulatory schemes granted it. The result
was Bill C-11: An Act to Amend the Copyright Act in 2002. The Bill attempted to
seal the breach in the oligopolistic hull the CRTC had opened with its Order30
three years earlier and upon which the aforementioned start-ups had tried to
capitalize, by, on first glance, preventing internet retransmitters from benefitting
from the exemption from copyright infringement retransmitters of broadcast
television that they had effectively possessed since Canadian Admiral Corp. v.
Rediffusion Inc. in 1954.31
Whereas government ministries had identified the stakes at hand in a 2001
consultation paper,32 the resultant amendments to the CCA encapsulated in Bill
C-11 did not reflect the concern demonstrated in the report. 33 The report noted
that the ramifications of unduly singling out one particular means of
transmission from benefiting from the retransmission users right would violate
the principle of technological neutrality through which the regime should be
approached.34 However, the Bill went against these prescriptions by appearing to

27

28

29

30
31

32
33

(Canadian Heritage), Consultation Paper on the Application of the Copyright Act’s
Compulsory Retransmission Licence to the Internet, (Ottawa: Industry Canada &
Department of Canadian Heritage, 22 June 2001) at 4 [Consultation Paper].
See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Public Notice
CRTC 1999197, Exemption order for new media broadcasting undertakings, 17 December
1999 [CRTC Order].
Disintermediary: “Anything that removes the ‘middleman’ (intermediary) in a supply
chain. A disintermediary often allows the consumer to interact directly with the
producing company. This cuts service costs from purchases made at a retailer and
increases market transparency with regards to manufacturers’ prices.” Investopedia,
‘‘Disintermediary”, online: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/disintermediary.asp>.
See generally Sunny Handa, ‘‘Retransmissions of Television Broadcasts on the Internet”
(2001) 8 Sw J & Trade Am 39 at 41; Public Notice CRTC 2003-2, supra note 1 at para 23.
See CRTC Order, supra note 27.
Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion, Inc., 1954 CarswellNat 5, [1954] Ex. C.R. 382
(Can. Ex. Ct.) [Rediffusion].
See Consultation Paper, supra note 26.
An Act to amend the Copyright Act, S.C. 2002, c. 26.
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ban retransmitters from using the internet—the technology JumpTV had
ominously foretold might “eventually replace cable, DTH satellite and
multipoint wireless distribution systems as the sole means of distribution.” 35 In
one fell swoop the CRTC’s much-lauded Order was handicapped and instead
used as a means by which the user rights regime necessary for the new media
exemption to be of use for retransmitters was denied. This has been the status
quo until the present era. While new media undertakings have flourished in the
past thirteen years,36 they have largely done so outside the BA’s regulatory
parameters.

II. THE AEREO DECISION
(a) Background
Founded in 2012 by Chet Kanojia, Aereo Inc. began as a technology
company based out of New York City that created a service (also called Aereo)
that allowed customers to stream OTA television broadcasts to their ipads,
iphones, or web browsers, for a small fee. Serving the New York City area first,
the service eventually expanded to other U.S. metropolitan areas, including the
Boston, Atlanta, and Dallas areas. By the end of 2013, Aereo had about 80,000
subscribers.37Aereo marketed itself as merely providing a rental service for a
powerful antenna and associated DVR system to be used at the subscriber’s
discretion. Given that it is legal for users to receive free and open television
signals captured over broadcast frequencies through the use of equipment
(traditionally dipole or ‘‘rabbit ears” antennas), Aereo purported its service as
providing for viewers a merely updated means to partake in a long-established
activity as old as television itself, and what was already well within their legal
rights.
In its technical operation, however, the service betrayed an awareness and
proficiency of the most up-to-date American copyright jurisprudence. 38Aereo
used dime-sized antennas contained in close-spaced arrays housed in its data
centers to capture OTA television broadcasts. Each antenna was assigned to a
particular subscriber. When the subscriber wished to watch a program, her
antenna was ‘‘activated,” the signal was picked up by the antenna, digitally
converted, and stored into the subscriber’s assigned cloud account from which
34
35
36

37

38

Consultation Paper, supra note 26 at 3-4.
Ibid at 7.
See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting and
Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2011-344, 25 May 2011 at paras 15; Broadcasting
Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-329, 4 June 2009 at para 11.
Peter Kafka, “Here’s How Many Subscribers Aereo Had Last Year” ReCode (21 July
2014), online: Recode <http://recode.net/>.
Roger Parloff, ‘‘Aereo is leaving the courts dazed and confused” Fortune (21 May 2012),
online: Fortune <https://fortune.com/>.
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the data is streamed to the customer’s platform of choice. The service used
geolocation technology, GPS and wifi to ensure that subscribers are limited to
receiving broadcasts from the maximum ambit a rooftop antenna from their
‘‘designated market area” (DMA) would ordinarily pick up.39 In this way it
attempts to mimic the technological constraints of OTA broadcasts in
accordance to which laws regulating conventional BDUs have been designed.
The elaborate method by which the service operates was designed in such a way
as to fall under the letter of the law as set out in a recent U.S. Court of Appeals
ruling pertaining to the legality of digital video recording services which make
use of the ‘‘cloud,” Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. [Cablevision].40

(b) The Cablevision Decision
Cablevision concerned a DVR subscription service that, like Aereo, allowed
subscribers a personal online storage account into which programs were stored
and from which these programs were streamed to the subscriber’s device. 41
Initially ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, the decision was overturned on appeal
and the court’s reasoning for why the service did not infringe copyright formed
the basis for the business models of several internet-streaming services that
appeared on the market shortly after the decision, including Aereo itself. 42
Essentially, the emphasis placed on the subscriber, rather than the service
provider, as the subject of ‘‘volitional conduct” —in this case, the copying of the
program onto the personal storage account—meant that no direct copying was
committed by the service provider, Cablevision,43 according to the reasoning of
the court. On whether the viewing of a program constituted a ‘‘performance to
the public” under the terms of the transmit clause, the court interpreted
‘‘performance to the public” to mean ‘‘the performance created by the act of
transmission”. Consequently, the playback by a subscriber of a program at her
own behest, from her own personal online account, constituted a transmission
that was private, rather than public, and thus not a ‘‘performance to the public”
for the purposes of the transmit clause.44
39

40

41
42

43

Ibid. “Basically, Aereo uses FCC maps to determine the maximum perimeter around the
New York City metropolitan area from which someone with a typical residential TV
antenna on her roof would be able to pick up over-the-air signals from New York City. If
the customer ventures outside that range, her phone’s GPS or wi-fi systems will
eventually detect that fact, and Aereo will dutifully cut off reception. (So, for instance,
some parts of the Hamptons get reception, some don’t.) Since it’s ordinarily not possible
to receive New York’s over-the-air signals with an antenna beyond a certain distance,
Aereo imposes analogous, if artificial, limitations on its users.”
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d121 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir.,
2008) [Cablevision].
Ibid at 125.
James Grimmelmann, ‘‘Why Johnny can’t stream: How video copyright went insane”
ArsTechnica (30 August 2012), online: ArsTechnica <http://arstechnica.com/> at 2, 3.
Cablevision, supra note 39 at 21, 23-25.
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This reasoning formed the bedrock on which Aereo’s technology was crafted.
By individualizing every aspect of the workflow—from the reception of
broadcast signals to their storage in a personalized account to their
conveyance to the individual subscriber—Aereo hoped that its service would
pass legal scrutiny in the same manner as Cablevision Inc.’s operations. The fact
that each transmission “is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy
produced by that subscriber” was key to the court’s finding in Cablevision that no
infringement occurred.45 Like a VCR supplier or copyshop, Aereo could thus
claim that it merely provided the technology through which subscribers could
copy to their personal accounts and view—transmissions that were for all
intensive purposes ‘‘private”. Had subscribers streamed the broadcasts to their
devices simply through a conventional server, this might not have been the case.
As such, Aereo designed its service so that subscribers would stream broadcasts
using the exact same method as Cablevision Inc.’s service, regardless of its
practicality or efficiency, in order to be, in Aereo’s eyes, in accord with American
copyright legislation.

(c) Aereo’s Legal Travails
Broadcasters did not agree. In March 2012 a number of them filed an action
against Aereo Inc. for infringement of the Copyright Act of 1976 [U.S. Copyright
Act] in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and sought a
preliminary injunction against Aereo.46 In July, the preliminary injunction was
denied, the judge stating that, amongst the other factors needing to be proven,
the plaintiffs had not established that Aereo’s service was materially
indistinguishable from the system upheld in Cablevision, and thus had not
demonstrated a prima facie case of a public performance copyright infringement
claim.47 While the court did not decide on whether there had been infringement
or not, it agreed with Aereo Inc.’s characterization of its system, stating that “the
copies Aereo’s system creates are not materially distinguishable from those in
Cablevision.”48
Unsatisfied with this decision, the broadcasters appealed to the 2nd Circuit
Court of Appeal and launched actions against Aereo in almost every market it
operated, most notably Massachusetts and Utah.
In April 2013, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the lower court,
stating that the district court had made no legal error in its characterization of
Aereo’s transmissions as not being public performances.49 Importantly, it also
44
45
46

47
48
49

Ibid at 36.
Ibid at 43.
See American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 2d 373 (S.D. New
York, 2012).
Ibid at 381, 404.
Ibid at 385.
Wnet, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2nd Cir., 2013) at pp. 682, 696.
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reaffirmed Cablevision, holding that “technical architecture matters.” 50 This
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, the preliminary injunction succeeded in Utah where the 2nd
Circuit Court’s Cablevision decision had no authority. Judge Kimble determined
that Aereo’s system was indistinguishable from that of a cable company
retransmitting to the public, falling squarely within the ambit of the U.S.
Copyright Act’s transmit clause designed expressly to encompass such
retransmissions of copyrighted content.51
This reasoning proved prescient. In June 2014 the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision was finally released. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer ruled that
Aereo’s service constituted a performance to the public under the transmit
clause.52 He did so through a ‘‘purposive interpretation” of the clause in light of
regulatory objectives, wherein Congress would have intended to regulate any
system functionally similar to cable retransmission systems.53 The fact that
broadcasts were recorded onto a personal copy for each user to view rather than
viewed from a single source did not make it functionally different. 54 Thus, Aereo
‘‘performed publicly”, and as such was subject to §111’s licensing regime in order
to retransmit OTA television lawfully.55

III. AEREO IN CANADA
(a) Ramifications of the Aereo decision to Canadian Copyright Law
The U.S. regulatory scheme for retransmissions differs substantially from
that of Canada. According to the majority in Aereo, Congress amended §101 to
overturn 1974’s Teleprompter v. CBS and added a complicated technologyspecific licensing regime with compulsory fees under §111. 56 Along with the
statutory license and royalty fees, consent by OTA stations to retransmit their
broadcasts is required by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 57 and

50
51

52
53
54
55
56

57

Ibid at 693.
Community Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 1191 (C.D. Utah,
2014) at p. 1205.
Aereo, supra note 6 at 21.
Ibid at 17.
Ibid at 14.
Ibid at 8.
Aereo, supra note 6 at 8; U.S. Copyright Act, supra note 10, §111; contra Aereo, supra note
6 at 23, Scalia J. dissenting (who disputes how the majority adduces congressional
intent).
See “Cable Carriage of Broadcast Stations”, online: Federal Communications
Commission <https://www.fcc.gov/media/cable-carriage-broadcast-stations>; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v. FCC, 117 S.Ct. 1174 (U.S. S.C., 1997) (affirming the
legality of ‘‘must carry” regulations).
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is generally subject to additional compensation by the BDU (a ‘‘value for signal”
regime).58
In contrast, in Canada ‘‘must carry” is the rule: licensed BDUs are required
to retransmit local broadcasts and in turn are granted a statutory user right to
retransmit those signals. Not only is compensation or royalties not needed,
consent is not required at all. A ‘‘value for signal regime”, as exists in the U.S.,
does not exist in Canada, and indeed the last attempt to set one up by the CRTC
was ruled ultravires by the Supreme Court in 2012.59 Finally, the 2012
amendments to the CCA60 have updated its language, creating express
references to the legality of particular types of uses digital undertakings
employ. Thus, any answer to the question of how the Aereo scenario would have
played out in Canada requires a detailed analysis of the relevant Canadian
regulatory scheme.

(b) Relevant Statutory Rights under the CCA
The contemporaneous retransmission of broadcasts, the subject matter of the
Aereo decision, potentially infringes upon two rights under the CCA: first, the
section 3(1)(f) right possessed by the owners of the works broadcast in the
transmission;61 second, the limited section 21 right possessed by the broadcaster
in the transmission itself. The fact that the retransmission is ‘‘streamed” to the
subscriber is no bar.62 The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the
broadcasters’ section 21 right “does not apply against BDUs”.63 Consequently,
while Aereo Inc. may not infringe the broadcaster’s limited section 21 right if it
58

59
60
61

62

63

‘‘Retransmission Consent”, online: Federal Communications Commission <https://
www.fcc.gov/media/policy/retransmission-consent>; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 Stat 1460 (1992).
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 61.
See Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 7.
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 56; Entertainment Software Assn., supra note 5: ‘‘CUFTA,
however, required Canada to compensate copyright owners for the retransmission of
television signals that were sent over cable lines. The amendments were therefore
designed to ensure that cable companies, and not just radio broadcasters, would also be
captured under s. 3(1)(f)” at para 24 [citations omitted]; ‘‘the replacement of the words
‘radio communication’ with ‘telecommunication’ should be understood as merely
expanding the means of communicating a work — that is, from radio waves (‘by radio
communication’) to cable and other future technologies (‘to the public by telecommunication’)” at para 25.
Public Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 35, 2012 CarswellNat 2378, 2012
CarswellNat 2379 (S.C.C.) at paras. 1-2, Rothstein J. [Rogers].
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 50: “BDUs are not a ‘‘broadcaster” within the meaning of
the Copyright Act because their primary activity in relation to communication signals is
their retransmission. Thus, the broadcaster’s s. 21(1)(c) right to authorize, or not
authorize, another broadcaster to simultaneously retransmit its signals does not apply
against BDUs. In other words, under s. 21 of the Copyright Act, a broadcaster’s exclusive
right does not include a right to authorize or prohibit a BDU from retransmitting its
communication signals.”

334 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[14 C.J.L.T.]

constitutes a BDU, outside of the retransmission regime of section 31(2), Aereo
Inc. is unlikely to defend its infringement of the rights owners’ section 3(1)(f)
right in any of the other ‘‘safe harbour” provisions in the CCA (though they may
help with its ‘‘timeshifting” function).

(c) ‘‘User Right” of Retransmission: Section 31(2)
The retransmission exception of section 31(2) of the CCA was first
characterized as a ‘‘user right” in a Federal Court of Appeals decision by
Judge Sharlow,64 which was, on appeal, affirmed and expanded upon by Judge
Rothstein in Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and
Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168 [‘‘Cogeco”], who, writing for the majority,
states that, “[t]he exception, or user’s right, in effect, entitles BDUs to retransmit
those works without the copyright owners’ consent, where the conditions set out
in paras. (a) through (e) are met.”65 The section 31(2) user right allows for the
simultaneous retransmission of broadcasts without infringing any copyright,
whether the section 3(1)(f) right or any other right the content-owner or
broadcaster might hold.66 Given the large number of copyright owners involved
in any broadcast signal, this user right is essential to the viability of any
retransmission service.67

(d) Does Aereo Qualify for the Retransmission Regime of Section 31?
The 2002 amendment to the retransmission regime of section 31 of the CCA
appeared to exclude internet retransmitters from benefitting from the user
right.68 In truth, it not so much banned internet retransmitters from the regime
but rather prevented any service operating under the Order from qualifying. 69
This is a subtle yet salient distinction that will be elaborated upon below.
Operating under the Order is generally not conducive to the failure of any
digital media undertaking. Indeed, many popular online services that provide
digital media in Canada, like Netflix, ostensibly do so under this order. 70
64

65
66
67
68
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70

Reference re Broadcasting Act (Canada), 2011 FCA 64, 2011 CarswellNat 398, 2011
CarswellNat 6332 (F.C.A.) Sharlow J.A., reversed Reference re Broadcasting Act, S.C.
1991 (Canada), 2012 CarswellNat 4810, 2012 CarswellNat 4811 (S.C.C.).
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 56.
Ibid at paras. 53-58.
Legislative Summary LS-437E, supra note 14 at 4.
See Consultation Paper, supra note 26.
See Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(1); CRTC Order, supra note 27.
See Michael Geist, ‘‘Does the CRTC Have the Power Regulate Online Video?: Internet
Companies Set to Challenge Its Authority” Michael Geist (23 September 2014), online:
Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2014/09/crtc-power-regulate-online-video-internet-companies-set-challenge-authority/>; Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission, Communications Monitoring Report: October
2014, ch. 5.0 (Ottawa: CRTC, October 2014) [Communications Monitoring Report
2014].
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However, given that Aereo’s business model depended on retransmitting the
radio signals transmitted by the station without fees or authorization, its viability
or the viability of an analogous service hinges on its qualification under section
31’s retransmission regime. In the following section I will demonstrate that an
Aereo-like service could benefit from the retransmission regime, and thus operate
legitimately, provided it obtained the requisite BDU licence that other BDUs
need to qualify. Second, I will discuss the factors that weigh in favour of Aereo
being eligible for a licence as a BDU under section 9 of Part II of the Act.

(e) Interpreting the User Rights Regime
If an entity is a retransmitter and fulfils the conditions of section 31(2)(a)-(e),
it is entitled to the user rights regime of section 31. In the case of Aereo, only the
first right is relevant. The regime is described in Cogeco as follows:
the owner’s general right to retransmit is restricted by a carve-out in s.
31(2) of the Copyright Act, which effectively grants to a specific class of
retransmitters two retransmission rights. The first right lets these users
simultaneously retransmit without a royalty payment, works carried in a
local signal. The second right lets them simultaneously retransmit works
carried in distant signals, but only subject to the payment of royalties
under a form of compulsory licence regime (Copyright Act, s. 31(2)(a)
and (d)). Both user rights are, subject to s. 31(2), beyond the owner’s
control.71

Section 31(1) is the interpretive provision for the retransmission regime. Its
definitions thus apply to the terms used in section 31(2):72
‘‘new media retransmitter” means a person whose retransmission is
lawful under the Act only by reason of the Exemption Order for New
Media Broadcasting Undertakings issued by the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission as Appendix A to
Public Notice CRTC 1999-197, as amended from time to time;. . .
‘‘retransmitter” means a person who performs a function comparable
to that of a cable retransmission system, but does not include a new
media retransmitter;

(i) Statutory Interpretation
The modern approach to statutory interpretation is noted by Judge
McLachlin in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R. as follows:
“the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”. The
interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a
71
72

Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 58 [emphasis added].
Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(1).
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textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is
harmonious with the Act as a whole.73

However, as Ruth Sullivan notes: ‘‘When a term is defined in a statute or
regulation, interpreters are bound to apply the definition stipulated by the lawmaker, which may depart from the ordinary meaning of the defined term.
Legislative definitions may be exhaustive or non-exhaustive.”74
First, the terms in question here are technical terms with meanings defined in
the regime’s interpretive provision. Given that the terms are exhaustive, they
“declare the complete meaning of the defined term and completely displace any
other meaning that the term might otherwise bear.”75 Thus, it is here and not
outside the statute—certainly not to any policy documents published by
regulatory agencies authorized under other statutes—that one should turn.
Second, the only previous user right identified by the Canadian courts until
Cogeco had been the CCA’s fair dealing provision. It was because of the user
rights paradigm introduced by CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada (CCH) that the principles of statutory interpretation applied to the fair
dealing provisions in question changed substantially.76
In Cogeco, the principles from which an expansive interpretation of fair
dealing provisions as user rights were drawn in CCH were applied to the
retransmission regime by Judge Rothstein.77 Given that the reasons underlying
the characterization of the retransmission regime as user rights in Cogeco were
73

74

75

76

77

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., 2005 SCC 54, 2005 CarswellNat 3212, 2005
CarswellNat 3213, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.) at para. 10, citing 65302 British Columbia
Ltd. v. R., 1999 CarswellNat 2222, 1999 CarswellNat 2223, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804 (SCC) at
para. 50 [citations omitted].
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 61-62.
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Legislation, (Markham, Ont: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2013) at
HCU-183 “Changes” at HLG-66 “Legislative definition prevails over ordinary meaning”. See also Mattabi Mines Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue), 1988 CarswellOnt
921, 1988 CarswellOnt 965, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.) at 194 [S.C.R.]; Yellow Cab Ltd.
v. Alberta (Industrial Relations Board), 1980 CarswellAlta 319, 1980 CarswellAlta 98,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) at 762 [S.C.R.]; Canadian Assn. of Broadcasters v. Society of
Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada, 1994 CarswellNat 1846, [1994] F.C.J.
No. 1540 (F.C.A.); R. v. Moore, 1985 CarswellNS 285, 67 N.S.R. (2d) 241 (N.S. C.A.) at
243-244 [N.S.R.]; R. v. Verma, 1996 CarswellOnt 4743, 31 O.R. (3d) 622 (Ont. C.A.).
2004 SCC 13, 2004 CarswellNat 2004, 2004 CarswellNat 447 (S.C.C.) at paras. 48, 51
[CCH]. Contra Cie ge´ne´rale des e´tablissement Michelin - Michelin & Cie v. CAW—Canada, 1996 CarswellNat 2297, 1996 CarswellNat 2711, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (F.C.)
(‘‘exceptions to copyright infringement should be strictly interpreted” at para. 68).
Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain inc. c. The´berge, 2002 SCC 34, 2002 CarswellQue 306,
2002 CarswellQue 307 (S.C.C.) at paras. 11,12, 30, as cited in Cogeco, supra note 4 at
paras. 64, 67; also cited in CCH, supra note 76 at para. 10; Society of Composers, Authors
& Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 2004
CarswellNat 1919, 2004 CarswellNat 1920 (S.C.C.) at para. 88 as cited in Cogeco, supra
note 4 at para. 65, 66.
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drawn from those principles introduced in CCH, as well as The´berge and Society
of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, and it was these same reasons that justified the application of
expansive interpretative principles in fair dealing, it is evident that the liberal
interpretive principles seen in CCH and in consequent fair dealing cases were the
result of the new “user rights” paradigm.
Thus, interpretative principles regarding such provisions would not only
prove helpful but could be determinative in the interpretation of the
retransmission regime: the Supreme Court in CCH noted that the fair dealing
provisions are to ‘‘be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure
that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.“78 Further, user rights should ”not
be interpreted restrictively“ as they are not mere defences, but an integral part of
copyright legislation.79
The retransmission regime as reflected by section 21(1) and section 31,
“represents the expression by Parliament of the appropriate balance to be struck
between broadcasters’ rights in their communication signals and the rights of the
users, including BDUs, to those signals.”80 The user right itself was expressly
adopted against the wishes of broadcasters who wished to retain an unrestricted
right to their broadcasts.81 As the Supreme Court states in Cogeco, this
retransmission regime ultimately serves the Copyright Act’s underlying purpose
to “balance the entitlements of copyright holders and the public interest in the
dissemination of works.”82
It is the need that the “traditional balance between authors and users should
be preserved in the digital environment”83 that grounds the Supreme Court’s
principle of technological neutrality through which Canadian copyright law
should be interpreted.84 Thus, in interpreting the statutory provisions at hand,
the principle of technological neutrality states that “absent evidence of
Parliamentary intent to the contrary, we interpret the Copyright Act in a way
that avoids imposing an additional layer of protections and fees based solely on
the method of delivery of the work to the end user.”85 Since the user right
reflected in section 31(2) that retransmitters retain against copyright
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
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CCH, supra note 76 at para. 51.
Ibid at 48.
Cogeco, supra note 4 at para. 67.
Ibid at para. 72.
Ibid at para. 70.
ESA, supra note 5 at para. 49.
But see Michael Birnhack, “Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law” (2013) 15
Yale J L & Tech 24, which argues that technological neutrality is an impossibility.
ESA, supra note 5 at para. 9; Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of
Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 2004 CarswellNat 1919,
2004 CarswellNat 1920 (S.C.C.) at 181; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003
Inc., 2014 FCA 84, 2014 CarswellNat 808, 2014 CarswellNat 809 (F.C.A.) at para. 39,
reversed 2015 CarswellNat 6092, 2015 CarswellNat 6093 (S.C.C.).
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infringement reflects the importance that Canadian copyright law places on the
dissemination of content to the public, its statutory provisions should not be
construed as to render outside of its scope (and thus impose an additional layer
of fees onto) internet-based disseminators solely by virtue of the method of
delivery they employ.
Given the interpretive rules of copyright legislation thus stated, the expansive
interpretation of user rights regimes in recent years, the underlying purposes
served by the user rights regime of section 31(2) in particular, and the principle of
technological neutrality grounded in these underlying purposes through which
the regime should be interpreted, exceptions to the regime should be construed
narrowly. Applying the interpretative principles above to the statutory definition
of ‘‘retransmitter” in section 31(1) thus yields two conditions to qualify as a
retransmitter:
a. not constituting a new media transmitter;
b. performing a function comparable to that of a cable retransmission
system.

Each of the above conditions with respect to Aereo will be evaluated in turn.

(e.1) Does Aereo Fit the Statutory Definition of ‘‘New Media Transmitter”?
‘‘New media transmitter” has a statutory definition:
“new media retransmitter” means a person whose retransmission is
lawful under the Act only by reason of the Exemption Order for New
Media Broadcasting Undertakings issued by the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission as Appendix A to
Public Notice CRTC 1999-197, as amended from time to time;86

According to this definition, if a retransmission is lawful under the BA only by
reason of the Order, the person whose retransmission it is constitutes a new
media retransmitter. In other words, a new media retransmitter is someone
whose retransmission, but for the Order, would be unlawful under the BA. Thus,
it is necessary to assess the grounds on which a retransmission of Aereo would be
lawful.

(i) Is Aereo a ‘‘broadcasting undertaking” under the Broadcasting Act?
The Broadcasting Act defines ‘‘distribution undertaking” as:
an undertaking for the reception of broadcasting and the retransmission thereof by radio waves or other means of telecommunication to
more than one permanent or temporary residence or dwelling unit or to
another such undertaking.87

86
87

Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(1).
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s. 2(1).
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If Aereo is a distribution undertaking then it constitutes a broadcasting
undertaking under the BA. This definition was written to be technologically
neutral, as opposed to its predecessor,88 and does not indicate that the
retransmission of OTA signals using a particular means of transmission would
bar an undertaking from being a BDU. In its Report, the CRTC notes that
‘‘transmission” over the internet is explicitly contemplated under the BA’s
definition of broadcasting.89 While CRTC’s broad understanding of its
jurisdiction, especially with respect to the internet, has often been called into
question, when the ‘‘transmission” in question is that of OTA broadcast
television, the reasoning is less controversial. In the words of Sunny Handa, “an
Internet retransmitter would be a BDU as defined in the Broadcasting Act and
hence subject to regulation under that Act.”90
Further, in Reference Re Broadcasting Act, in deciding whether internet
service providers were ‘‘broadcasting undertakings” under the BA, the
unanimous court stated that, ‘‘the term ‘broadcasting undertaking’ does not
contemplate an entity with no role to play in contributing to the Act’s policy
objectives.“91 As per section 3(1)(t), two of its relevant policy objectives with
respect to distribution undertakings are as follows:92
(i) should give priority to the carriage of Canadian programming
services and, in particular, to the carriage of local Canadian stations,
(ii) should provide efficient delivery of programming at affordable
rates, using the most effective technologies available at reasonable cost,

Aereo directly engages in these policy objectives through its services. As stated
earlier, it retransmits local OTA broadcast television to a local area. It does so at
a lower cost than most conventional competitors and uses the most effective
technologies to do so. With regard to the scheme, purpose, and wording of the
BA, Aereo is likely to constitute a broadcast distribution undertaking, which
under section 2(1) is a kind of broadcasting undertaking. Note that if Aereo were
not a kind of broadcasting undertaking, then it would be outside the scope of the
BA and thus outside of the CRTC’s ability to regulate altogether.

(ii) Would Aereo qualify as a ‘‘new media broadcasting” under the Order?
The Order is defined as follows:
... the Commission exempts persons who carry on, in whole or in part in
Canada, broadcasting undertakings of the class consisting of new

88
89
90
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See Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1967-68, c. 25.
Report, supra note 24 at para. 39.
Handa, supra note 29 at 46.
Reference re Federal Courts Act (Canada), 2012 SCC 4, 2012 CarswellNat 214, 2012
CarswellNat 215, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 142 (S.C.C.) at para. 5.
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s. 3(1)(t).
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media broadcasting undertakings, from any or all of the requirements
of Part II of the Act or of a regulation thereunder.

New media broadcasting undertakings provide broadcasting services
delivered and accessed over the internet, in accordance with the interpretation
of “broadcasting” set out in the Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 199984/
Telecom Public Notice CRTC 9914, Report on New Media, 19 May 1999. 93 The
Order was made pursuant to section 9(4) of the BA, which permits the CRTC to
exempt certain classes of broadcasting undertakings from having to abide by the
regulations of Part II of the BA broadcasting undertakings are otherwise
expected to follow. As a distribution undertaking is a kind of broadcasting
undertaking under section 2(1), it is thus possible for Aereo to qualify under the
Order. Further, Aereo clearly qualifies under the stated definition of ‘‘new media
broadcasting undertaking.”
Given that the retransmission of an undertaking that qualifies for the Order
is lawful under the BA, if Aereo makes a retransmission without first having
applied for a licence, it will be lawful and thus would clearly fit the statutory
definition of ‘‘new media retransmitter” under section 31(1) of the CCA.
However, this is not the only avenue of legality. Nothing prevents Aereo from
applying for a licence and thus being lawful under the BA for a reason other than
qualifying under the Order.

(iii) Interpretive Context
This reading of the provision is supported by the legislative history of the
retransmission regime. The legislative summary of the bill underlying the 2002
amendment states:
The ‘‘Internet carve-out” that is currently proposed in the bill, however,
does not shut the door entirely. Internet retransmissions might yet
qualify for the compulsory licence if, having regard to the definition of
‘‘new media retransmitter” in clause 2(2) of the bill, such retransmissions become lawful under the Broadcasting Act by means other than
the CRTC’s 1999 Exemption Order.94

Michael Geist puts it as follows:
In plain language, the post-iCraveTV framework means that services
can’t both rely on the Copyright Act retransmitter provision and the
CRTC Order. If the retransmitter relies on the Copyright Act, it will be
subject to regulation under the Broadcasting Act. Alternatively, if the
service is excluded from Broadcasting Act regulation by qualifying
under the new media exemption, it cannot rely on the Copyright Act
provision and must obtain licenses to avoid copyright infringement
claims.95
93
94
95

CRTC Order, supra note 27.
Legislative Summary LS-437E, supra note 14.
Michael Geist, ‘‘The Ghost of iCraveTV?: The CRTC Asks Bell For Answers About Its
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Thus, this wording was intended to give some flexibility. It was made with
the intention of denying those retransmitters that make use of the exemption
clause from benefitting from the user right to retransmit, while allowing for those
that successfully qualify for a license—the ordinary requirement for a BDU to be
lawful under the BA—to benefit from the regime like other licensed
retransmitters. By hinging their exception from the user right on the use of the
Order, Parliament put the ball in the CRTC’s court.

(iv) Can Aereo make a retransmission that is lawful under the BA without
relying on the Order?
It has already been established that Aereo can qualify as a BDU. Aereo is
thus not precluded from applying for a license. In the absence of the Order, an
internet-based retransmitter would be lawful in the same manner that another
retransmitter would be lawful—that is, it would be lawful subject to the licensing
requirements imposed on retransmitters laid out in the BA. The Order merely
exempts undertakings that qualify for it from having to fulfill the licensing
requirements imposed on other retransmitters. However, not requiring a license
to be lawful under the BA does not deny retransmitters the ability to qualify for
licensing. Given that Aereo would qualify as a BDU under the BA, there is no
reason it cannot apply for, and ultimately attain, a licence.
Of course, the CRTC may reject an application for a license, but there is a
possibility that the CRTC can reject the application of any prospective BDU, not
just that of Aereo—all licenses are pursuant to CRTC approval. The fact that
this discretion exists, however, does not make an internet-based retransmitter
like Aereo pre-emptively barred from applying for a licence. Thus, the
definitional amendments to section 31(1) suggests two options:
1) If the internet-based retransmitter goes ahead and starts retransmitting without obtaining a license as is required of a BDU, it will be
lawful under the BA only because of the Order. As such, it will count as
a ‘‘new media transmitter” according to the CCA’s statutory definition
and would not qualify as a retransmission as set out in section 31(1),
and thus inapplicable to the user right regime in section 31(2).
2) The internet-based retransmitter can apply for a license like any
other BDU. In this case, as a retransmitter operating pursuant to the
conditions of its license, it would be lawful under the BA in the same
way that any BDU operating pursuant to its licence would be lawful.
Since its lawfulness does not depend on the Order it no longer fits the
statutory definition of ’new media retransmitter’ and could fit the
definition of ‘‘retransmitter” as long as it “performs a function
comparable to that of a cable retransmission system”. Retransmission

Mobile TV Service in Net Neutrality Case” Michael Geist (7 August 2014), online:
Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/> [emphasis added].

342 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[14 C.J.L.T.]

would become its user right (pursuant to fulfilling the other requirements of section 31(2)).

(e.2) Does Aereo Perform a ‘‘Function Comparable to that of a Cable
Retransmission System”?
If, as established earlier, Aereo does not necessarily fall under the statutory
definition of ‘‘new media retransmitter” but falls under the definition of
retransmitter in section 31(1), then it can qualify for the retransmission user
right. The definition of retransmitter is as follows:
‘‘retransmitter” means a person who performs a function comparable
to that of a cable retransmission system, but does not include a new
media retransmitter;96

As stated earlier, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the Aereo
system was analogous to that of a cable retransmission system.97 Indeed, its
decision that Aereo was in violation of the plaintiffs’ copyright hinged on this
comparison. Justice Breyer noted that “[i]nsofar as there are differences, those
differences concern not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as
the technological manner in which it provides the service.”98 While there remain
formidable distinctions between Canadian copyright law and that of the United
States, Canadian courts often look at how American courts have dealt with
particular issues in order to shed new light on the case at hand. This is especially
the case when the factual situation is the same.99
In Aereo, Justice Breyer’s factual characterization of the functioning of the Aereo
service in terms of a cable retransmission system is helpful because it does not
rest on particular features of U.S. copyright law but rather on a broad
characterization of the functioning of Aereo’s service as compared to
conventional cable retransmission systems, operations of which are not
functionally different from those of Canada. His focus on the “nature of the
service” rather than the “technological manner in which it provides the service”
echoes the principle of technological neutrality under Canadian copyright law
and particularly the Supreme Court’s statement in Rogers to consider the
“broader context” to ensure that “form does not prevail over substance” when
examining internet transmissions.100 Given this precedent, if Aereo was to be
decided in Canada there is little reason why this finding by the U.S. Supreme
96
97
98
99
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Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(1).
Aereo, supra note 6 at 12-17.
Ibid at 17.
Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, 2006 CarswellOnt 6182, 2006 CarswellOnt
6183, (S.C.C.) at para. 42; see also Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business
Information, Inc., 1997 CarswellNat 2752, 1997 CarswellNat 2111, [1998] 2 F.C. 22
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused 1998 CarswellNat 3212 (S.C.C.).
Rogers, supra note 62 at para. 30.
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Court would not prove persuasive, if not determinative, in any assessment on
whether Aereo “performs a function comparable to that of a cable
retransmission system.”
Thus, there is little preventing Aereo from fulfilling the definitional
requirements of a retransmitter if it falls outside of the definition of “new
media retransmitter” and provided it fulfills the conditions set out in section
31(2)(a)-(e), it would qualify under the retransmission regime. This is even more
likely in light of the addition of section 31(3) to the retransmission regime in the
2002 amendment. Section 31(3) gives legislative flexibility in adapting the regime
to the needs of particular classes of retransmitters, allowing ‘‘local” and
‘‘distance” signals a modified definition.101 This is particularly suited to Aereo or
an Aereo-like service, which mimics the boundaries of OTA broadcasters not as a
constraint but as a choice.102 The ability to tailor the retransmission regime
under section 31 to the particular realities of Aereo’s mode of retransmission
gives even less of a reason to deny it recourse under the regime simply on the
basis of its mode of retransmission.

(f) Would Aereo’s Time-Shifting Feature be Legal in Canada?
In addition to simultaneous viewing of broadcast television, Aereo also
allowed users to record the broadcast for viewing later. The broadcast would be
recorded on the user’s personal cloud account for later viewing. A single copy
was recorded onto the user’s personal cloud account, which only the user could
access.103 While the plaintiff’s lawsuit against Aereo was against all aspects of its
service, the injunction was with respect to “only the aspects of Aereo’s service
that allow subscribers to view plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs
contemporaneously with the over-the-air broadcast of these programs” 104 and
thus it was only with respect to this aspect of the Aereo service that the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled against the company.105 If an Aereo-like service were to
operate in Canada, then the time-shifting aspect of the service must also be
evaluated.
This function of Aereo’s service likely falls squarely within section 29.23(1) of
the CCA, an exception to copyright infringement (or possible user right) for
fixing a broadcast for later viewing introduced in 2012’s Copyright Modernization
Act.106 Given that only a single copy is made (section 29.23(1)(c)) and only the
individual can access this copy (section 29.23(1)(f)), Aereo falls within the
statutory requirements of the ‘right’ as long as the broadcast itself was viewed
101
102
103
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Parloff, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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legally (section 29.23(1)(a)). Thus, its applicability is conditional on Aereo falling
under the retransmission regime of section 31(2) (and thus the broadcast being
legal) or having independently sought the right to retransmit from the
broadcaster and relevant content-holders.
Regarding the limitation in section 29.23(2) against on-demand services, and
whether it would apply to Aereo, it is important to note that the mere act of
deciding to copy the transmission does not make it ‘‘on demand” as this is
precisely what is meant to be a defence against infringement. The service the user
can decide to record is a live transmission and thus not freely available ‘‘ondemand”, being subject to the schedule of the broadcast station. Thus, this
acceptable use mimics that of a VCR, which is indisputably legal, whereas the
copying of an on-demand program would mimic that of copying a rental video,
and would not fall under the section 29.23(1) exception.
While it is unclear if the ‘‘safe harbour” provision of section 31.1(4) would
apply to Aereo, given the permissibility of time-shifting granted in the above
provision, it is not likely to be necessary. Thus, as long as the section 31(2) user
right is applicable to the broadcast itself the time-shifting aspect of Aereo’s
service is not likely to fall afoul of any Canadian copyright law.

(g) Could (Should?) Aereo Receive A License?
While one may argue that a retransmitter would not be expected to apply for
a BDU licence under the BA if not obliged in order to retransmit lawfully under
the BA, a BDU is required to have a licence in order to benefit from the CCA’s
retransmission user right. Lawfulness under the CCA is as essential to lawfulness
under the BA to the effective functioning of this user right.
Further, to the contention that the existence of the Order suggests that even
if a retransmitter were to apply for a license like any other BDU, the CRTC
would certainly deny the application, this is not necessarily the case. Note that,
for example, following the release of the Order the CRTC then granted a license
to an internet protocol-based cable retransmitter. 107 The CRTC had, as is in its
jurisdiction, required the BDU to address particular concerns in order to be
granted the licence, which the BDU met to the CRTC’s satisfaction. 108
In a recent federal court decision involving the Order, the court writes, “the
CRTC Order was rendered necessary by the new media context and especially by
the arrival of the Internet. The CRTC could not regulate all the broadcasting
content aimed at Canadian listeners: this task would be simply
insurmountable.”109 It was easier to avoid having to regulate altogether than
risk months of backlogged applications for licenses from an array of different
107

108

109

See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Decision CRTC
2000-754, 18 September 2000.
Ibid. (“[t]he applicant plans to use Internet Protocol (IP) digital technology to deliver
programming services to persons residing in these properties”).
Unicast S.A. v. South Asian Broadcasting Corp., 2014 FC 295, 2014 CarswellNat 873,
2014 CarswellNat 874 (F.C.) at para. 59.

AEREO DYNAMICS: "USER RIGHTS" AND INTERNET RETRANSMISSION

345

technological services operating in vastly different areas of content creation or
distribution. Retransmission of broadcast signals, however, conforms much
more closely to the broadcasting distribution undertakings ordinarily regulated
by the CRTC.
In its last report on internet-based retransmitters released in 2003, the CRTC
laid out several concerns, identified both by concerned parties and the
Commission itself, which needed to be addressed before it could consider
internet-based retransmitters under the licensing regime.110 These concerns will
be addressed below.

(i) The internet’s architecture has changed
The primary concern of the Commission and of interested parties was the
geographical reach of internet retransmissions.111 The regulability of the internet
has changed112 since the report was published back in 2003, when it noted that,
‘‘there is currently no completely workable means of preventing unauthorized
use of Internet retransmissions, whether it be program decoding, sharing and
recording, rerouting to other users or signal modification to insert or remove
advertising.”113 Geographical restrictions to the access of websites are common
today, as demonstrated by Quebec’s demand a few years ago that online retailers
that did not operate in French block access to their websites from
Quebec.114Aereo uses geolocation technology, which “assigns geographic
borders to Internet users and their conduct.”115 Geolocation has advanced to
such a point that Aereo can set precise limits to the extent of its operating service,
not simply jurisdictional but metropolitan. As stated earlier, Aereo limits its
ambit to the DMA determined by the FCC for a particular region. As the CRTC
sets similar boundaries for licence holders, combined with its subscriber-model,
Aereo would have little trouble adapting such requirements as needed.

(ii) Other concerns
The other concerns largely amount to the following: 1. Internet transmission
opens up the ability to time-shift; 2. The signal can be altered; 3. Canadians do
not have enough bandwidth for the retransmission of video signals; 4. Possibility
of advertisements in display screen; and 5. The internet transmission system does
not have the capacity to provide audio-visual works of acceptable quality.
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Time-shifting, as stated earlier, was added as a statutory user right in 2012’s
Copyright Modernization Act and is a well-established use amongst television
viewers.116 Note that broadcast television has been able to be recorded since the
creation of VCRs. The potential that signals can be altered is present in any
retransmission technology. In the preceding eleven years technological advances
and usage patterns have made the other concerns moot, as has been conceded by
the CRTC itself.117

(iii) Broadcasting Distribution Regulations
Further, an assessment of the requirements it imposes on holders of the
‘‘terrestrial distribution undertakings” licence pursuant to sections 16-17(5) of
the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations reveals that Aereo is capable of
fulfilling the retransmission requirements of the licensee’s ‘‘basic service”. 118 In
fact, these requirements are the primary means by which the CRTC fulfills the
objectives of the BA. It also has the ability to regulate the rates of ‘‘basic service”
to ensure that it is affordable to consumers. Given that Aereo’s business model is
built around the retransmission of local signals—something the CRTC has to
compel other retransmitters to do as a matter of policy—and has performed this
service at a competitive price in the United States, surely merits at least an
evaluation of its viability as a licence holder given its potential to further several
of the objectives of the BA.119

IV. THE USER RIGHT TO RETRANSMIT: SIMPLY A STATUTORY
ENTITLEMENT?
On the adoption of user rights in Canada, David Vaver commented that their
“full implications have not yet fully been worked out.”120 With the right to
retransmit as only the second provision from the CCA to be explicitly referred to
as a ‘‘user right” by Canadian courts, this is no less true. Because most discussion
of user rights in Canadian copyright law has almost exclusively focused on fair
dealing, the constitutive aspects of user rights as distinct from fair dealing is not
clear. For instance, some statements in past jurisprudence suggests that fair
dealing is more important than other exemptions because they, unlike the others,
are user rights.121 In other cases, exemptions are synonymous to user rights.122
116
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Thus, an examination of the retransmission user right is an excellent means to
determine the contours of a user rights paradigm normally obscured by fair
dealing’s overbearing shadow.
In “Taking Rights Seriously”, Drassinower posits that the legitimacy of fair
dealing as a user right rests on the assertion of an ‘‘authorial right” while at the
same time not placing oneself in the ‘‘authorial locus” of the original creator. 123
The user right to retransmit, as identified in Cogeco, however, does not seem to
fit such a model. It is hard to argue that the right of a BDU to reproduce a signal
is built upon the BDU’s ‘‘authorial” use of the signal, given that the right in
question rests upon the signal remaining unaltered.124 And the historical origins
of the legality of retransmission in Canada rest on the act of retransmission being
deemed by the courts as not being significant enough to infringe the owner’s
copyright.125
Thus, if retransmission is a user right, it must be one of the non-authorial
user rights Drassinower identifies in ‘‘a more general category of user rights.” 126
On the rationale of such a right, he notes ‘‘[t]he point is that no wrong arises
where the reproduction in question is but incidental to viewing a publicly
accessible work.”127 This is more in accord with the retransmission user right of
section 31(2). Applying this rationale, the user right to retransmit is a nonauthorial right justified under the explicit objective of promoting the public
interest that underlies the CCA, along with the cultural objectives of the BA,
together forming a larger statutory scheme under which this right operates. 128
Like fair dealing above, however, under this framework the ‘‘use” in question is a
‘‘user right” because, being a purely non-authorial right (‘‘the signal is
retransmitted. . .without alteration”)129 it does not usurp the creator/owner’s
authorial locus, whereas fair dealing is a user right because the user in that case
asserts her own authorial right.130
The retransmission user right can also be explained by reference to David
Lange’s concern that new intellectual property claims ‘‘tends to blur, and then

122

123
124
125
126
127
128

129
130

Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC 37, 2007 CarswellNat 2087, 2007 CarswellNat 2088
(S.C.C.) at para. 79, Bastarache J.
CCH, supra note 76, McLachlin C.J.: ‘‘[t]he fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in
the Copyright Act, is a user’s right” [emphasis added] at para. 48.
Drassinower, supra note 8 at 475-476.
Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(2)(c).
See Rediffusion, supra note 29.
Drassinower, supra note 8 at 476.
Ibid.
Cogeco, supra note 4: ‘‘[h]owever, these powers must be exercised within the statutory
framework of the Broadcasting Act, and also the larger framework including interrelated
statutes. This scheme includes the Copyright Act” [citations omitted] at para 2.
Copyright Act, supra note 5, s. 31(2)(c).
Drassinower, supra note 8 at 477.

348 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[14 C.J.L.T.]

displace, important individual and collective rights in the public domain” 131 and
thus the ‘‘recognition of new intellectual property interests should be offset today
by equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in the public domain.” 132
Given that the new section 21 right granted to broadcasters was the result of the
interests of U.S. broadcasters as reflected in Canada’s free trade negotiations
with the U.S.,133 the granting of the new corollary user right in section 31(2)
could be interpreted as a recognition by Parliament that ‘‘[e]mphasis on the
protected domain leads to neglect of the public domain.”134 In order to protect
the public interest served by the retransmission of broadcast television, the
encroachment into the public domain represented by the broadcaster’s right to
retransmissions that had heretofore been part of the public domain was
accompanied by the creation of a corresponding user right, therefore maintaining
the balance between Canadian copyright law’s dual objectives.
Both of these understandings help see the retransmission user rights regime
as both conceptually distinct and closely linked to fair dealing. They represent
very different ‘‘uses” that are nonetheless both user rights because neither of
them abrogate the authorial claim of the creator.135 However, the user right to
retransmission is also an explicit statutory counterbalance, similar to fair dealing,
to the owners’ transmission rights to ensure not only that the public interest in
the dissemination of works is not unduly restricted, one of the dual objectives of
the CCA, but in also fulfilling the objectives of the BA in disseminating works
that enhance the “cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada.” 136

V. CONCLUSION
Given the level of vertical integration with respect to Canada’s conventional
BDUs and television stations, the current users of the right to retransmit are
becoming increasingly indistinguishable from those with the opposing
broadcasters’ right. This fact only makes it more imperative that those who
operate solely as retransmitters are not prematurely precluded from their user
right simply on the basis of a stagnant conception of the milieu in which the
retransmission of public spectrum radio signals occurs. As public consumption
habits change so too should our conception of the environment in which
retransmission, and the complementary sets of owners’ and users’ rights with
respect to retransmission, exist.
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Using a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, this paper offers one possible
method by which an internet-retransmitter may lawfully operate in Canada. It is
not the only possible method—merely one that requires the least legislative
impetus. Another more proactive solution may be for the CRTC to create a new
exemption order specifically for internet retransmitters. If it is clear that the
retransmitter is operating under the new exemption rather than the one
referenced in section 31(1) (by amending the old exemption Order to exclude
internet retransmitters, for instance) then Aereo may lawfully function under the
retransmission regime. Such a solution is not likely to be considered viable,
however, if it is made subject to a determination from a public hearing, a forum
where, to paraphrase an old critique of the process,137 oligopolist BDUs simply
relate the preservation and promotion of their own economic welfare directly to
the CRTC’s protection of the public interest while depicting potential outside
competitors as a decided threat to Canadian culture.
As Aereo Inc. begins the Chapter 11 process, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
recently consented to its streaming technology to be sold off.138 If the successor
to the technology sets its eyes on Canada, the CRTC could do better than to
reflexively accommodate the loudest existing licensees. With prudence the
government might even consider purchasing the technology itself, in a bid at
cultivating the culture-disseminating potential of the public spectrum on its own
terms. Either option is more sensible than the status quo, however, which
cultivates nothing so much as an increasing disregard toward Canada’s
broadcasting regulator by the public-at-large it was ostensibly created to serve. 139
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